IPR protection strength and the market for knowledge by Nagy, Benedek
Bajmócy, Z. – Lengyel, I. (eds) 2009: Regional Competitiveness, Innovation and Environment. 
JATEPress, Szeged, pp. 183-197. 
 
IPR Protection Strength and the Market for Knowledge 
Benedek Nagy 
 
The world of today is called information society. This means, that information, knowledge 
and achievements of the intellect are gaining in importance in production over the more 
conventional factors of production like labour or capital. Who has the knowledge and the 
know-how, also has the advantage in competition.  
Knowledge or intellectual products have, however, characteristics of a common good, 
which preclude its trade, and hinders specialisation in its production. Knowledge is common 
good inasmuch as there is no rivalry in its use, and lso no natural excludability. Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) are an artificial way to at least partial excludability which can – 
beside encouraging innovation – render intellectual products tradable.  
In this paper I am going to focus on the trade relat d aspects of intellectual property 
rights from an institutional economics point of view. I intend to explore the relationship 
between tradability as determined by the strength of the actual IPR regime and the intensity 
of trade in intellectual properties across countries. I am exploring the theoretical basis for 
the relationship between international mobility of intellectual products and the country’s IPR 
regime. Based on models and cross-country empirical data the strength of intellectual 
property rights does influence the magnitude of trade of intellectual products between 
countries. My hypothesis is, that when a country’s IPR regime becomes stricter relatively to 
its trading partners, this facilitates the inflow of knowledge to the country. This is the 
technology transfer that can help developing countries to grow. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades it becomes increasingly clear, th t those countries will be able to 
benefit from the new kind of international competition which can better adapt to the 
challenges of the knowledge-based economy. Knowledge is gaining in importance 
as an input to the production process. Therefore it is n the best interest of the 
countries and governments to facilitate knowledge production and try to manipulate 
its international spread in their own favour. This paper uses an institutionalist point 
of view to show how this can be done by an appropriately formulated intellectual 
property rights protection regime.  
Intellectual property rights, or property rights more broadly, are institutions 
which are taken as given or exogenous by neoclassical economic models. In this 
paper, however, what is seen to influence important economic outcomes is the 
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design of this institution itself. Therefore I have to tackle the problem from a 
different point of view.  
The New Institutional Economics seems a good choice. Institutions have 
always played an important role in the life of mankind, but their economic aspects 
have just recently started to be explicitly investiga ed. Starting with the influential 
works of R. H. Coase as far back as the 1930s, the new institutional economics  
a) views institutions as not being neutral, but influencing economics outcomes,  
b) rather than discarding the whole apparatus of the neoclassical economics, tries to 
link functioning of the institutions with the marginalist methodology and c) tries to 
use institutional variables as endogenous within the neoclassical framework. 
Thinking about property rights and their causes and effects has a long tradition in 
philosophy, dating back of course to the Greeks, to Aristotle. This line of thinking 
found its way to economic thinking only recently. In his 1960 paper, the Problem of 
Social Costs, Coase emphasises the economic importance of property rights. The 
famous Coase-theorem about how clearly established property rights enhance the 
efficiency of the market system in the presence of xternalities is already a part of 
most every undergraduate microeconomic textbook. In the next decades numerous 
distinguished scholars such as Armen A. Alchian, Harold Demsetz, Douglas C. 
North, Oliver Williamson and Richard A. Posner – to name just a few – contributed 
to this new economics of property rights.  
Property right in economics means “actual power to control or affect the use 
of an object, of some aspect thereof” (Makaay 1999, p. 247.). This controlling or 
affecting can typically mean 3 things: a) usage of the object (usus), b) appropriating 
the returns thereof (usus fructus) and c) the transferring of these rights partly or fully 
to another person (abusus). Clearcut property rights and their guaranteed 
enforcement are perquisites of a well-functioning, Pareto-optimal market economy. 
If any of these essential rights is restricted, either by a government authority or by 
the nature of the object of the property rights, efficiency can not be warranted. 
The third of these rights is in connection with thefr edom of contracts and 
trade. As Makaay writes (1999, p. 248., italics mine): “A person who controls the 
use of an object may find it profitable to allow another person to use it, or to exploit 
it with the help of another person. To this end, the owner enters into an agreement 
with the other person. The agreement defines the permissible uses for the other 
person, and thereby confers on him or her some economic property rights.”  
The above quote implies, that both using our property ourselves or selling it to 
someone is driven by the profit-motive and leads to the efficient usage of the 
property. If there are any limitations to any of these parts of the property (that is, 
limiting the economic property right that can be conferred on someone, or limiting 
this conferring itself), efficiency cannot be ascertained. 
We also have to be aware of the fact, that the property right system is not 
static, but dynamically changing. Since it is, in the institutionalist view, an 
endogenous variable, it is not merely a given factor that determines other variables, 
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but is itself dependent on other economic variables and processes. The emergence of 
new kinds of objects with new characteristics requires the emergence of appropriate 
property rights. The tailoring of property rights to the characteristics of the different 
objects can be a natural, evolutionary process, left to the market, but more often than 
not it is done by the government.  
In the first section I identify special characteristic  of intellectual products 
which the appropriate property rights system has to handle to be able to facilitate 
trading. In the second section I present predictions  the model-level and findings 
on the empirical level how the system of property rights influence trade. The third 
section compares the cross-country empirical results to the Hungarian situation. 
Throughout the whole paper I will concentrate not on the built and structure of the 
IPR protection system, but only on its strength. 
2. Special characteristics of intellectual products and intellectual property 
rights 
Intellectual products differ by their very nature from physical products in some 
important aspects. The most important of these for us now is their being common 
goods. This means, that there exists no rivalry in the usage or consumption of 
intellectual products. Once a certain piece of an intellectual product has been 
produced – written, invented etc. – it can be used even simultaneously in more 
production processes without any one specific usage precluding any other. 
Considering knowledge a common good in this sense supports the argument that 
knowledge should be freely available for anyone and everyone. It has been quickly 
recognised, however, that the producers of intellectual products will not be 
sufficiently interested in producing them if they can not appropriate the returns from 
their inventions due to their non-excludability characteristic as a common good. 
Based on this recognition, intellectual property protection by way of property rights 
appeared in England for example as early as the 14th century (David 1992). 
The role of intellectual property rights is to artificially create shortage in the 
case of a product where scarcity is necessarily absent by virtue of the nature of the 
product (May 2005). This artificial scarcity serves as a basis for the (at least partial) 
excludability of intellectual products, and enables the (again at least partial) 
appropriation of the returns thereof. By creating excludability, intellectual products 
are rendered tradable, price can be set for their usage, which may result in profit for 
the producer of the intellectual product. This kind of partial excludability is 
indicated by the name quasi-common good. 
The goal of the different instruments of intellectual property rights protection 
– patents, trademarks, copyright – is to make it rat on l to invest resources in the 
production of intellectual products, meaning the “promot[ion of] the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts “ by “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
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the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” (David 1992, 
quoting the constitution of the United States). 
Many studies exist that show how the patent system can foster the creation of 
intellectual products, or knowledge, starting with t e seminal works of  
Arrow (1962) and Nordhaus (1967). In this paper I am more interested in how the 
patent system, more broadly, the intellectual property rights system influences 
trading in knowledge. 
Intellectual property protection aims not only at protecting the creators of new 
intellectual products – this was also not the main reason for which it was used in the 
14th century England mentioned above – but at encouraging the spreading of new 
knowledge. Clear property rights allow of trading. Market prices which can be set 
due to excludability encourage not only efficient production, but also efficient 
allocation, which means that by the logic of the market mechanism the intellectual 
products will find their way to the most efficient users through trading.   
Intellectual products have some important characteristics that can be 
identified as influencing their tradability1:  
1. Appropriability, meaning the possibility that the inventor be the exclusive 
beneficiary of the profits from the invention. 
2. Fungibility, meaning the possibility to simultaneously use the same unit of 
knowledge in more than one production processes. 
3. Complexity, meaning the diversity of complementary pieces of knowledge 
required to generate a new piece of knowledge. 
4. Cumulability, meaning complementarity between the alr ady existing stock 
and the new flow of knowledge. 
5. The stickiness of knowledge to human capital and routines (Antonelli 2004,  
p. 423.). 
 
An intellectual property right regime has to be able to adequately handle all 
these characteristics in order to enable efficient trading on the intellectual products’ 
market. 
Trading in intellectual products involves transaction costs both on the supply 
and demand side. These costs cover the cost of finding the right trading partner, that 
is, the cost of inspecting the quality and expected usability of the ware to be traded, 
of the elimination of opportunistic tendencies and the risk of inappropriable 
derivative returns (Antonelli 2004, p. 423.). 
                                                   
1 Tradability can be defined, following Antonelli (2004) as the degree to which a certain intellectual 
property without physical form can be bought and sol  on the market. 
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3. Intellectual property protection and trading with intellectual products 
Establishing a clear intellectual property rights (IPR) system makes trading with 
intellectual product possible. The possibility of trading in turn leads to 
specialisation, meaning that it is no more necessary fo  everyone to produce 
knowledge and innovate for themselves, but the production of these can be done by 
specialists having comparative advantage in their production. Knowledge can then 
be acquired from these specialists through the market. Research and development 
can be detached from production. Producers can have t e necessary knowledge and 
technology from the researchers, and researchers do not have to bother with the 
commercial development of their ideas, like they had to in earlier centuries 
(Lamoreaux–Sokoloff 2001). The separation and cooperation of the two spheres are 
rendered possible by the market for intellectual products by way of intellectual 
property protection measures. 
In this section I am talking about knowledge transfer in a very general sense. 
The model I introduce and the empirical test of its predictions are at the macro level. 
These do not say anything about the actual process, how knowledge is being 
transferred from one country to another. Neither is it important here, how individual 
firms find out, what knowledge and what innovations it is worth to acquire from 
outside the home country, or what determines the regional spreading of knowledge 
and innovations. Although these are all certainly important questions, I will 
concentrate here only on the aggregate, macro level. 
There exists a number ways to transfer knowledge from one country to 
another. “International technology transfer refers to the process by which a firm in 
one country gains access to and employs technology developed in another country” 
(Falvey–Foster 2006, p. 23.). This has many ways and methods, that can and has 
been both theoretically and empirically explored. The possible ways include 
international trading in technology-intensive products, international flow of foreign 
direct investments, cross-country licensing, or even patenting in a different country.  
International trading in intellectual products is one these market-conform way 
technologies can spread in the globalised world2. The same way it is important for a 
domestic market of intellectual products to clearly establish property rights, 
international trading in intellectual products is strongly influenced by the relation of 
the different national property rights regimes. As to how exactly national differences 
in the strength and design of the IPR system influece international trade in 
intellectual products, no generally accepted theoretical explanation has yet emerged 
in the literature. 
                                                   
2 As opposed to certain non-market-conform ways like non-market transactions and spillovers (Falvey–
Foster 2006) 
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4. Modelling the link between IPR regimes and technology transfer 
There are at least two characteristics of a country’s intellectual property rights 
regime, that can influence the inter-country flow of intellectual products, namely its 
design and its strength. The first model I will cite here shows how the design of the 
system influences trade (although differences in design can be translated into 
differences in terms of strength), and the second mo el will concentrate on the 
system’s strength or strictness as an important determinant variable. 
Building on the work of Dornbusch et al (1977), Taylor (1993, 1994) models 
at the macro level, how the strength of an IPR regim  influences international 
trading in products and services and intellectual products. The model is a Ricardian 
trade model, where production and R&D is carried on in the different countries 
based on the relative factor costs. International trade then may or may not equalise 
factor costs in R&D depending on the institutional setting. Taylor finds, that there is 
„a link between asymmetries3 in patent protection [between countries] and resulting 
trade distortions” (Taylor 1994, p. 363.). His model finds, that „Asymmetric 
protection of intellectual property rights: (1) distorts the pattern of trade in both 
goods and R&D, raises the relative wage rate of the country that imported R&D, and 
eliminates technology transfer between countries; (2) lowers the amount of labour 
allocated to R&D activities worldwide. […] (3) lowers R&D in the country that 
exported R&D, and raises R&D in the country that imported R&D.”  
(Taylor 1994, p. 374.). It is important to observe, that the second statement is in 
connection with the encouraging role of IPR protection in the production of 
intellectual products (and its role in promoting economic growth, in turn), the first 
and the third makes a statement about the role it plays in influencing international 
trade in these. The first statement is especially remarkable as it establishes a link 
between the relative strength of IPR regimes and the trade in conventional goods 
and services. The model’s third prediction basically means, that if a country’s IPR 
regime discriminates against innovations made abroad, and the country is one that 
originally imported knowledge from outside, he will be less able to do so, and has to 
conduct R&D himself, even though he has comparative disadvantage.   
What is more important in Naghavi’s 2007 model is the explicit 
differentiation of the more developed North, capable of conducting R&D, and the 
less developed South, willing to acquire knowledge from the North directly or 
indirectly. Naghavi shows, that the looseness or strictness of the IPR regime in the 
South not only influences knowledge flow between North and South, but also 
determines for the North the more profitable way to enter the Southern market. In 
his model, trading with goods embodying new knowledge is an indirect way for the 
                                                   
3 He defines the IPR regimes symetric if results of research and development conducted in another 
country enjoys the same degree of protection domestically, as those conducted domestically, and 
asymetric if the regime offers protection only for those intellectual products whose researches are 
conducted domestically  Asymmetry therefore means a difference in the scope of the protection. 
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South to acquire new technologies through imitating or reverse engineering, while 
Northern firms’ investing directly in the South makes copying the new technology 
easier. For the Northern firm, this two ways of entering the Southern market are 
complementary: by exporting it incurs tariff costs, but lowers competition as the 
technology itself is not readily available for copying in the South. In the FDI case 
transportation costs can be spared, but only at the cost of higher competition because 
of imitation. The model finds two bottom-line variables determining the export 
versus FDI question for the North: efficiency of the R&D project in the North 
indicated with g4 and the level of technology spillovers in the South marked β,5 
which is an institutional variable to be set strategically by the South6. Figure 1 shows 
how these two variables determine the way Northern firm enter the Southern market, 
that is, the channel through which knowledge is being transferred from one country 
to another. 
















FDI (SP) FDI (SP)
g  
Source: Naghavi (2007, p. 69.) 
 
β shows the strength of the IPR regime in the South. Higher values mean less 
strict protection. β* shows the value at any g, at which it the North is indifferent 
between exporting to the South or investing directly abroad. If β is smaller than that 
(more strict IPR protection in the South), it is more profitable to invest directly, and 
spare tariff costs. If exporting is the outcome, the Northern firm becomes a 
monopoly in the South, in the FDI case, however, a duopoly arises. βˆ is the 
threshold value, under which it is not profitable to the Northern firm to access the 
Southern market through FDI and β** is that level of IPR protection, under which it 
                                                   
4 Meaning basically how a unit of R&D cost incurred by the North reduces Northern production costs. 
5 Meaning in turn how a unit of Northern R&D cost reduces Southern production cost. 
6 The variable β itself is the product of the imitation costs b and the strictness of the Southern IPR 
protection regime ι. The model takes b as given, it is thus only scaling the effects of the actual 
institutional variable to be set. 
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is profitable for the Northern firm to invest directly, but it should spend as much on 
R&D that it becomes unprofitable for the Southern fi m to compete, and a restrained 
monopoly situation arises. In sum, a low β value is supposed to induce more R&D in 
low-tech industries (crowding out exports, though) and stimulate high levels of 
R&D spending in hi-tech industries. Thus both in the case of less and more 
technology-intensive industries it is rational for the Southern government to pre-
commit itself to a strict IPR regime, as it induces transfer of technology to the South 
(Naghavi 2007, p.71.)7. 
If the differences in national IPR regimes do have n impact on international 
technology diffusion, then their appropriate fine-tuning can become a new way of 
competition between countries and also a new possibility for levelling off. 
Endowment with or accessibility to knowledge might be less predetermined, 
constrained than endowment with natural resources, apital or labour. If it can be 
proven that the type (strength) of IPR systems as a new tool in the hand of a national 
government can influence international flow of capit l and technology transfer, than 
using Ghosh’s words we can speak of a „new mercantilism”, of a new tool a 
government can use to compete more efficiently at the international level (Ghosh 
2003, p. 85.). 
5. Empirical studies of the link between IPR strength and transfer of 
technology 
To test empirically, whether a link between the strngth of IPR systems in a country 
and transfer of technology to that country could be established, two questions have 
to be answered: first, how to measure the strength of national IPR regimes, and 
second how to measure the magnitude of transfer of t chnology. 
For the measurement of the strength of IPR regimes, Ginarte and Park 
developed a composite index in their 1997 paper8. Their index measures IPR 
strength along 5 dimensions, giving a number 0-1 to each, and then taking the sum 
of these to be the Ginarte-Park index, later referrd to simply as Patent Right Index. 
The five dimensions are coverage (meaning what can and what can not be subject of 
protection), membership in international treaties (the Paris Convention, the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty and the International Convention f r the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants), enforcement (whether the legislation provides adequate 
                                                   
7
 Naghavi also shows, that stringent IPR protection des not only attract more FDI to the South and 
induce higher levels of R&D in the North, but also enhances Southern welfare more, than does a looser 
IPR regime.  
8 Beside this Ginarte-Park index, empirical studies use another, called Rapp-Rozek index to which due 
credit is given both in Ginarte–Park (1997) and Falvey–Foster (2006). 
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mechanism for the law to be enforced), and restrictions to exercising IPRs (eg. 
compulsory licensing), and duration of protection.9  
For the measurement of the magnitude of transfer of technology many 
different indicators can be used. Falvey and Foster (2006) enumerate 4 basic 
channels through which technology can flow from onecountry to another, and that 
is through international trade, through foreign direct investment, through licensing 
agreements and through cross-national patenting.  
In their original study Ginarte–Park (1997), the aim of the study was to 
examine, what determines the Ginarte-Park Index as a dependant variable. In Park 
and Lippoldt (2003) the authors conducted an empirical study to examine whether a 
statistical relationship can be established between th  strength of IPR regimes as an 
independent variable and technology transfers, either in the form of foreign direct 
investment or in the form of technology-intensive merchandise import. They 
conducted a regression analysis where they use the above mentioned Ginarte-Park 
Index to measure the strength of the IPR system as an explaining variable. Beside 
that, their regression analysis has many control variables (like country-risk or per 
capita GDP), accounts for individual, country-specific effects like culture or quality 
of institutions (Park–Lippoldt 2003, p. 16). The countries involved are grouped into 
two groups of developed countries and least developed countries. Table 1 shows the 
percentage change (and the significance level in brackets) in inward and outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and exports and imports due to a one percentage 
change in the strength of IPR regimes (as measured by the Ginarte-Park index). 
Table 1. Ginarte-Park Index elasticities 
Effect of strengthening 





Inward FDI to GDP 0,49 (p=4,4%) 0,73 (p=1%) 2,76 (p=2%) 
Outward FDI to GDP 1,69 (p=0,0%) 1,90 (p=0,0%) 6,11 (p=0,1%) 
Exports to GDP 0,172 (p=16,6%) insig. insig. 
Imports to GDP 0,315 (p=1,1%) 0,243 (p=14,4%) insig. 
Source: Park–Lippoldt (2003) 
 
The effects of increasing the IPR index raised both inward and outward FDI 
for both country groups, and the effect was stronger for the least developed 
countries. The result thus is, that a rise in a country’s IPR index will on average rise 
inward FDI and technology intensive merchandise imports to the country. The IPR 
index had only a moderate effect on aggregated import and export, and this effect 
was not even significant for the least developed countries. This leads the authors to 
the conclusion, that intellectual property rights protection affects exports and 
imports only in a very roundabout way, and on the other hand that trading and direct 
                                                   
9 In a 2008 paper (Park–Lippoldt 2008), this patent right index is developed further, and an index for 
the strength of copyright protection and trademark right protection is included. 
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investments function as complementary in the case of t chnology transfer10. This 
latter conclusion is completely in accord with the results of Naghavi’s model. 
Strengthening the IPR systems can contribute to the flow of technology 
transfer towards the developing countries (Park–Lippoldt 2003, p. 8.), be it either 
through foreign direct investments or the import oftechnology-intensive 
commodities. The strength of intellectual property regime is however not the only 
determinant of knowledge diffusion. Some other influencing factors, the effects of 
which could even be studied at the model level might be the extent of the market, 
the quality of the labour force, the infrastructure, political stability etc.  
Even if we take the strictness of IPR protection as a determinant of knowledge 
inflow into a country, it may not be the absolute, but the relative strictness of the 
protection that matters. In the next section I will use the Ginarte-Park index of 
countries to measure the differences in the strictness of IPR protection between 
trading partners, and see whether and how this influe ces knowledge inflow as 
understood by Park and Lippoldt (2003, 2008). I will use Hungary as a target 
country. Based on the above studies of Park and Lippoldt, my prediction is, that as 
Hungarian IPR protection gets stricter relative to that of its trading partners, this 
encourages knowledge inflow, while as it gets looser, it discourages knowledge 
inflow. 
6. Patent Right Index and technology transfer in the case of Hungary 
Neither the original 1997 study by Ginarte and Park, nor the 2003 study by Park and 
Lippoldt includes Hungary. Park in his 2008 paper (p. 2.), however gives the values 
of the Ginarte-Park index for Hungary. For the years 1960-1990 Hungary scores an 
average of 2,20. For the year 1995 the index is 4,04 remaining unchanged for 2000, 
and rising to 4,5 to the year 200511. Having the scores of the patent right index for 
different years, and having the model of Park–Lippoldt (2008), we can see, whether 
the Hungarian data support my predictions. Park–Lippoldt (2008) has the 
methodology of what to measure and how to measure. Th y regress a) stock of 
inward FDI, b) technology-intensive merchandise imports and c) technology-
intensive service imports to the Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Rights. In their paper, 
they use data from altogether 120 countries, which they divide into three groups: 
developed countries (25), developing countries (68,including Hungary) and least 
developed countries (27). What they find is, that 1% rise in the Ginarte-Park index is 
                                                   
10 Falvey and Foster (2006) also enumerate (p. 25) many other ways how technology transfer can be 
measured with the corresponding methodological difficulties. 
11 The Patent Rights Index for Hungary is, however, different, being 3,71 in 2000 and 3,37 in 1995 
(Park – Wagh 2002, p. 40.). Partial figures are: 0,71 for Coverage, 1,00 for Duration, 0,67 for 
Enforcement, 1,00 for Membership in International Treaties and 0,33 for Protection from Restrictions 
on Patent Rights. 
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accompanied by a 1,65% rise in inward FDI to developing countries (as opposed to 
11,2 to developed and 1,66 to least developed countries). A 1% rise in the Patent 
Right Index goes together with 1,34% rise in merchandise imports to developing 
countries (compared to 9,86 to developed countries and 0,54 to least developed 
countries). Also, the coefficient for service imports to developing countries is 0,99 
(9,99 to developed countries and 0,97 to least developed countries). They also give 
coefficients in a sectoral breakdown: they list those parts of merchandise imports 
and service imports which are the most likely to bring along with them the transfer 
of new technologies, and see how these are related to the strength of the IPR 
system12. In the case of the merchandise imports these are: pharmaceuticals, office 
and telecom equipments, organic and inorganic chemicals, electrical and electronic 
products, aircraft and spacecraft-related products and optics and precision equipment 
(Park–Lippoldt 2008, p. 37.). In the case of services imports they list communication 
services, computer and information services and royalties and license fees  
(Park–Lippoldt 2008, p. 43.). I also acquired data for Hungary in these categories. 
Table 2 shows foreign direct investment, technology-intensive merchandise 
import and technology-intensive services import for the years 2000 and 2005 into 
Hungary. As a reference, I indicate in the first column the Ginarte-Park index for 
Hungary. 











2000 4,04 22 869,9 16 101,3 461,0 
2005 4,50 61 970,1 32 842,4 1 956,8 
Note: All boldface numbers are in million current USD 
Source: MNB, KSH, UNCTAD 
 
It is important to note here, that Hungary fits the original Park–Lippoldt 
prediction inasmuch as a rise in the IPR index from 4,04 to 4,50 is in fact 
accompanied by an increase in technology-intensive merchandise and services 
import to Hungary. My objective now is to see where th se merchandise and 
services come from: do they come from countries where intellectual property rights 
are strongly or loosely protected? Do they come from c untries that have a stronger 
or looser IPR regime, than Hungary? Is this inflow f merchandise or services 
sensible to changes in the absolute IPR protection s re gth or its relative state to the 
trading partner?  
Having data of the above categories broken down to countries of origin it is 
now possible to see, whether any connection can be seen between change in 
Hungary’s relative IPR strength to its trading partne s and the change in stock of 
                                                   
12 The model certainly also uses control variables. 
 Benedek Nagy 
 
194
inward FDI, technology-intensive merchandise imports and technology-intensive 
service imports, respectively. To see this I used data for only those countries, for 
which Park (2008) gives a Ginarte-Park index, which is, 120 countries. This means, 
that in the case of inward FDI, in 2000 88,1% and i 2005 90,3% of the whole 
inward FDI is covered. In the case of the technology-intensive merchandise imports, 
this means 99,46% and 98,64%, respectively, and in the case of the technology-
intensive service imports, 98,57% and 97,56%, respectively. From the sample I 
excluded those items, where trade or FDI stock was 0 in at least one of the years, 
and also excluded outliers, where the change in either way was more than tenfold 
during the five-year interval. After these exclusions my data account for 86,7% of 
the inward FDI stock in 2000 and 76,68% in 2005, in the case of merchandise 
import these percentages are 99,45% and 98,58, respectively and for the services 
import they are 97,28% and 83,42%, respectively. I took into account further 
variables that could also have their effect, like th absolute value of the IPR index or 
GDP growth. 
According to my prediction if Hungary employs a relatively stricter IPR 
protection regime as a trade partner country, technology-intensive merchandise and 
service import and FDI from that country should increase. 
Statistics, however, do not show any discernable relationship between the 
change in relative IPR strength of a partner country and the change in the value of 
technology-intensive merchandises coming to Hungary from that particular country. 
All the variables together explain only a tiny percentage of the change in 
technology-intensive imports and FDI inflow.  
This could on one hand be interpreted, that a change i  the trading partners’ 
relative IPR regime strengths can in and by itself not determine the magnitude of 
knowledge inflow, and is not even the most important f ctor determining it. It seems 
odd, however, that while an increase in the strength of IPR protection does attract 
more knowledge from outside, we cannot attract significantly more just by putting 
ourselves in a relatively better protected situation. On the other hand this could mean 
as well, that inflowing knowledge requires a certain level of IPR protection, and 
once it is reached, Knowledge can be imported regardless of the level of IPR 
protection in the exporting country.  
Still the data show that the higher the partner countries score on the 
independent variable (relative IPR strength), the gr ater the upward spread of the 
dependent variable (knowledge inflow in the various above mentioned forms) can 
be. This could be meaning, that the change in the relative IPR strength does not, per 
se, determine technology transfer through these channels, but a greater positive 
change in Hungary’s relative IPR strength is able to allow for higher technology 
transfer, while the smaller the positive change or the greater the negative change, the 
less it is able to do so. It is also possible, thate data are heteroskedastic, meaning 
that countries to the right has better chances of exhibiting higher growth in 
knowledge transfer than countries to the left, for s me reason in connection with 
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their scoring higher on the independent variable, but this heteroskedasticity 
hypothesis can not be tested on this model. 
This model should be extended and studied further. The main task to be done 
is identifying further variables that influence knowledge inflow to Hungary from the 
trade partners. My aim is to identify country groups that behave significantly 
differently than other countries, when it comes to transferring knowledge-intensive 
products and services to Hungary.  
On the international level, there are continuous efforts being taken to facilitate 
the mobility of this quasi-common good. The institutional measures are trying to 
benefit everyone, including the seller and buyer country of the intellectual product, 
and also its creator. 
One field of these efforts are The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty proposed by the World Trade Organisation. This 
aims at the international harmonisation of national IPR regimes. The treaty was 
signed at the Uruguay round of GATT/WTO, and entered into force on the 1st 
January, 1995. This treaty prescribes minimal standards for national IPR legislation, 
specifying also some exceptions. Second, it also includes rules regarding the 
enforcement of the treaty. Third, it also designs a dispute resolution mechanism.  
It would however exceed the scope of this theoretical paper to examine the effects of 
the TRIPS agreement on the international market of intellectual products. This way, 
the trade-distorting effects of different national legislations can be circumvented. 
A second field is the development of the institutional foundations of the trade 
in intellectual properties, including ways for example to reduce transaction costs. 
7.  Conclusion 
Theoretical studies show, that the actual shape and built of a nation’s intellectual 
property rights protection system can and does haveeffect on the international flow 
of intellectual products through the markets. Stronger IPR protection attracts more 
intellectual products into a country.  
My objective was to test if there is a link between the strength of a country’s 
IPR protection system relative to the partner countries and knowledge-intensive 
import from that particular country. If this is the case, different countries can shape 
their IPR regimes to profit more from the international flow of knowledge, while 
this can be a disadvantage for others. 
In the case of Hungary, however, I found no such link of any significance, 
which could possibly mean, that if an IPR protection regime is strong enough in 
absolute terms, certain units of knowledge can be imported, otherwise not, 
regardless of how much the protection is stronger than this threshold value.  
The international efforts to standardise IPR system indicate, that differences in 
relative strength still have some effect. 
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It is thus up to further studies to examine, how exactly varying relative 
strength of IPR systems influence technology transfer o  the above mentioned kind, 
or other kinds, like the international flow of knowledge workers and human capital, 
and the resulting knowledge products as embodied in patents or copyrights. 
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